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Abstract 
Confidentiality protection for linked administrative data is a combination of access modalities and 
statistical disclosure limitation. We review traditional statistical disclosure limitation methods and newer 
methods based on synthetic data, input noise infusion and formal privacy. We discuss how these 
methods are integrated with access modalities by providing three detailed examples. The first example is 
the linkages in the Health and Retirement Study to Social Security Administration data. The second 
example is the linkage of the Survey of Income and Program Participation to administrative data from the 
Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration. The third example is the Longitudinal 
Employer-Household Dynamics data, which links state unemployment insurance records for workers and 
firms to a wide variety of censuses and surveys at the U.S. Census Bureau. For examples, we discuss 
access modalities, disclosure limitation methods, the effectiveness of those methods, and the resulting 
analytical validity. The final sections discuss recent advances in access modalities for linked 
administrative data. 
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Abstract 
 
Confidentiality protection for linked administrative data is a combination of access modalities and 
statistical disclosure limitation. We review traditional statistical disclosure limitation methods and 
newer methods based on synthetic data, input noise infusion and formal privacy. We discuss how 
these methods are integrated with access modalities by providing three detailed examples. The first 
example is the linkages in the Health and Retirement Study to Social Security Administration data. 
The second example is the linkage of the Survey of Income and Program Participation to 
administrative data from the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration. The 
third example is the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics data, which links state 
unemployment insurance records for workers and firms to a wide variety of censuses and surveys 
at the U.S. Census Bureau. For examples, we discuss access modalities, disclosure limitation 
methods, the effectiveness of those methods, and the resulting analytical validity. The final 
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Introduction1 
The use of administrative data has long been a part of the procedures at national statistical 
offices (NSOs), as evidenced by the various chapters in this book. The censuses and surveys 
conducted by NSOs may use sampling frames built at least partially from administrative data. 
For instance, the U.S. Census Bureau has used a business register - a list of all domestic 
businesses - derived from administrative tax filings since at least 1968. This register is the frame 
for its quinquennial censuses and annual surveys of business activity (DeSalvo et al. 2016). It is 
also used to link businesses across surveys, to link surveyed businesses to other administrative 
record data, and as a direct source of statistical information on the levels and growth of 
business activity, published as the County Business Patterns (CBP) and Business Dynamics 
Statistics (BDS).2 Similar examples can be found in most countries that maintain some kind of 
registry for their businesses. In many countries, similar centrally maintained registers are used 
as frames for censuses and surveys of a country’s inhabitants and workers. Chapter 17 
illustrates the Swedish approach to this problem for a national population census.3 The Institute 
for Employment Research (IAB), the research institute of the German Employment Agency, 
uses social security notifications filed by firms, and data generated from the administration of its 
mandated programs, to sample firms and workers. McMaster University and later Statistics 
Canada used administrative job termination notifications (“record of employment”) filed by 
employers to survey departing employees for the Canadian Out-of-Employment Panel (COEP) 
(Browning et al. 1995). Other uses of administrative data in NSOs include linkage for quality 
purposes (Chapters 8, 14 and 15), and data augmentation (Chapter 12 for the National Center 
for Health Statistics approach) 
 
In addition, the increasing computerization of administrative records, has facilitated more 
extensive linking of previously disconnected administrative databases, to create more 
comprehensive and extensive information. Methods to link databases within administrative units 
based on common identifiers are easy to implement (see Chapter 9 for more details). In the 
United States, which does not have a legal national identifier or ID document, the increased use 
of the social security number (SSN) has facilitated linkage of government databases and among 
commercial data providers. In many European countries, individuals have national identifiers, 
                                               
1 John M. Abowd is the Associate Director for Research and Methodology and Chief Scientist, U.S. 
Census Bureau, the Edmund Ezra Day Professor of Economics, Professor of Statistics and Information 
Science, and the Director of the Labor Dynamics Institute (LDI) at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA. 
https://johnabowd.com Ian M. Schmutte is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Georgia, 
Athens, GA, USA. http://ianschmutte.org. Lars Vilhuber is Senior Research Associate in the Department 
of Economics and Executive Director of Labor Dynamics Institute (LDI) at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 
USA. https://lars.vilhuber.com. The authors acknowledge the support of a grant from the Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation (G-2015-13903), NSF Grants SES-1131848, BCS-0941226, TC-1012593. Any opinions and 
conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
U.S. Census Bureau, the National Science Foundation, or the Sloan Foundation. All results presented in 
this work stem from previously released work, were used by permission, and were previously reviewed to 
ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. 
2 See www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html and www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/.  
3 In the United States, a combination of multiple lists and input by regional and subject matter experts is 
used to compile the frame for the Census of Population and Housing. 
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and efforts are underway to allow for cross-border linkages within the European Union, in order 
to improve statistics on the workforce and the businesses of the common economic area 
created by what is now called the European Union. However, even when common identifiers are 
not available, linkage is possible (see Chapter 15). 
 
The result has been that data on individuals, households and business has become richer, 
collected from an increasing variety of sources, both as designed surveys and censuses, as well 
as organically created “administrative” data. The desire to allow policy makers and researchers 
to leverage the rich linked data has been held back, however, by the concerns of citizens and 
businesses about privacy. In the 1960s in the United States, researchers had proposed a 
“National Data Bank” with the goal of combining survey and administrative data for use by 
researchers. Congress held hearings on the matter, and ultimately the project did not go forward 
(Kraus 2013). Instead, and partially as a consequence, privacy laws were formalized in the 
1970s. The U.S. “Privacy Act” (Public Law 93-579, 5 U.S.C. § 552a), passed in 1974, 
specifically prohibited “matching” programs, linking data from different agencies. More recently, 
the 2016 Australian Census elicited substantial controversy when the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) decided to keep identifiable data collected through the census for a 
substantially longer time period, with the explicit goal of enabling linkages between the census 
and administrative data, as well as linkages across historical censuses (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2015; Karp 2016). 
 
Subsequent decades saw a decline in public availability of highly detailed microdata on people, 
households, and firms, and the emergence of new access mechanisms and data protection 
algorithms. This chapter will provide an overview of the methods that have been developed and 
implemented to safeguard privacy, while providing researchers the means to draw valid 
conclusions from protected data. The protection mechanisms we will describe are both physical 
and statistical (or algorithmic), but exist because of the need to balance the privacy of the 
respondents, including the confidentiality protection their data receive, with society’s need and 
desire for ever more detailed, timely, and accurate statistics. 
Paradigms of protection 
There are no methods for disclosure limitation and confidentiality protection specifically 
designed for linked data. Protecting data constructed by linking administrative records, survey 
responses, and “found” transaction records relies on the same methods as might be applied to 
each source individually. It is the richness inherent in the linkages, and in the administrative 
information available to some potential intruders, that poses novel challenges. 
 
Statistical confidentiality can be viewed as “a body of principles, concepts, and procedures that 
permit confidentiality to be afforded to data, while still permitting its use of for statistical 
purposes” (Duncan et al. 2011, p.2). In order to protect the confidentiality of the data they 
collect, NSOs and survey organizations (henceforth referred to generically as data custodians) 
employ many methods. Very often, data are released to the public as tabular summaries. Many 
of the protection mechanisms in use today evolved to protect published tables against 
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disclosure. Generically, the idea is to limit the publication of cells with “too few” respondents, 
where the notion of “too few” is assessed heuristically.  
 
We will not provide a detailed history or taxonomy of statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) and 
formal privacy models, instead referring the reader to other publications on the topic (Duncan et 
al. 2011; Dwork & Roth 2014; FCSM 2005). We do need to set up the problem, which we will do 
by reviewing suppression, coarsening, swapping, and noise infusion (input and output). These 
are widely used techniques and the main issues that arise in applications to linked data can be 
understood with reference to these methods. 
 
Suppression is widely used to protect published tables against statistical disclosure. 
Suppression describes the removal of sub-tables, cells or items in a cell from a published 
collection of tables if the item’s publication would pose a high risk of disclosure. This method 
attempts to forge a middle ground between the users of tabular summaries, who want 
increasingly detailed disaggregation, and publication rules based on cell count thresholds. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses suppression as its primary SDL technique for data 
releases based on business establishment censuses and surveys. From the outset, it was 
understood that primary suppression -- not publishing easily identified data items -- didn't 
protect anything if the agency published the rest of the data, including summary statistics. Users 
could infer the missing items from what was published (Fellegi 1972). The BLS, and other 
agencies that rely on suppression, make “complementary suppressions” to reduce the 
probability that a user can infer the sensitive items from the published data (Holan et al. 2010). 
But there is no optimal complementary suppression technology - there are usually multiple 
complementary suppression strategies that achieve the same protection. 
 
Researchers, however, are not indifferent among these strategies. A researcher who needs 
detailed geographic variation will benefit from data in which the complementary suppressions 
are based on removing detailed industries. A researcher who needs detailed industry variation 
will prefer data with complementary suppression based on geography. Ultimately, the committee 
that chooses the complementary suppression strategy will determine which research uses are 
possible and which are ruled out.  
 
But the problem is deeper than this: suppression is a very ineffective SDL technique. 
Researchers working with the cooperation of the BLS have shown that the suppression strategy 
used in major BLS business data publications provides almost no protection if it is applied, as is 
currently the case, to each data release separately  (Holan et al. 2010). Some agencies may 
use cumulative suppression strategies in their sequential data releases. In this case, once an 
item has been designated for either primary or complementary suppression, it would disappear 
from the release tables until the entire product is redesigned. 
 
Many social scientists believe that suppression can be complemented by restricted access 
agreements that allow the researcher to use all of the confidential data but limit what can be 
published from the analysis. Such a strategy is not a complete solution because SDL must still 
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be applied to output of the analysis, which quickly brings the problem of what output to suppress 
back to the forefront. 
 
Custom tabulations and data enclaves Another traditional response by data custodians to the 
demand by researchers for more extensive and detailed summaries of confidential data, was to 
create a custom tabulation, a table not previously published, but generated by data custodian 
staff with access rights to the confidential data, and typically subject to the same suppression 
rules. As these requests increased, the tabulation and analysis work was offloaded onto 
researchers by providing them with access to protected microdata. This approach has 
expanded rapidly in the last two decades, and is widely used around the world. We discuss it in 
more detail later in this chapter. 
 
Coarsening is a method for protecting data that involves mapping confidential values into 
broader categories. The simplest method is a histogram, which maps values into (fixed) 
intervals. Intuitively, the broader the interval, the more protection is provided. 
 
Sampling is a protection mechanism that can be applied either at the collection stage or at the 
data publication stage. At the collection stage, it is a natural part of conducting surveys. In 
combination with coarsening and the use of statistical weights, the basic idea is simple: if a table 
cell is based on only a few sampled individuals which collectively represent the underlying 
population, then statistical inference will not reveal the attributes of any particular individual with 
any precision, as long as the identity of the sampled individuals is not revealed. Both coarsening 
and sampling underlie the release of public use microdata samples.  
Input noise infusion  
Protection mechanisms for microdata are often similar in spirit, though not in their details, to the 
methods employed for tabular data. Consider coarsening, in which the more detailed response 
to a question (say, about income), is classified into a much smaller set of bins (for instance, 
income categories such as “[10,000; 25,000]”). In fact, many tables can be viewed as a 
coarsening of the underlying microdata, with a subsequent count of the coarsened cases.  
 
Many microdata methods are based on input noise infusion: distorting the value of some or all 
of the inputs before any publication data are built. The Census Bureau uses this technique 
before building publication tables for many of its business establishment products and in the 
American Community Survey (ACS) publications, and we discuss it in more detail for one of 
those data products later in this chapter. The noise infusion parameters can be set such that all 
of the published statistics are formally unbiased--the expected value of the published statistic 
equals the value of the confidential statistic with respect to the probability distribution of the 
infused noise--or nearly so. Hence, the disclosure risk and data quality can be conveniently 
summarized by two parameters: one measuring the absolute distortion in the data inputs and 
the other measuring the mean squared error of publication statistics (either overall for censuses 
or relative to the undistorted survey estimates).  
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From the viewpoint of empirical social sciences, however, all input distortion systems with the 
same risk-quality parameters are not equivalent. In a regression discontinuity design, for 
example, there will now be a window around the break point in the running variable that reflects 
the uncertainty associated with the noise infusion. If the effect is not large enough, it will be 
swamped by noise even though all the inputs to the analysis are unbiased, or nearly so. Once 
again, using the unmodified confidential data via a restricted access agreement doesn't 
completely solve the problem because once the noisy data have been published, the agency 
has to consider the consequences of allowing the publication of a clean regression discontinuity 
design estimate where the plot of the unprotected outcomes vs. the running variable can be 
compared to the similar plot produced from the public noisy data. 
 
An even more invasive input noise technique is data swapping. Sensitive data records (usually 
households) are identified based on a priori criteria. Then, sensitive records are compared to 
“nearby” records on the basis of a few variables. If there is a match, the values of some or all of 
the other variables are swapped (usually the geographic identifiers, thus effectively relocating 
the records in each other's location). The formal theory of data swapping was developed shortly 
after the theory of primary/complementary suppression (Dalenius & Reiss 1982, first presented 
at American Statistical Association (ASA) Meetings in 1978). Basically, the marginal distribution 
of the variables used to match the records is preserved at the cost of all joint and conditional 
distributions involving the swapped variables. In general, very little is published about the 
swapping rates, the matching variables, or the definition of “nearby,” making analysis of the 
effects of this protection method very difficult. Furthermore, even arrangements that permit 
restricted access to the confidential files still require the use of the swapped data. Some 
providers destroy the unswapped data. Data swapping is used by the Census Bureau, National 
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), and many other agencies (FCSM 2005). The Census 
Bureau does not allow analysis of the unswapped decennial and ACS data except under 
extraordinary circumstances that usually involve the preparation of linked data from outside 
sources then re-imposition of the original swap (so the records acquire the correct linked 
information, but the geographies are swapped according to the original algorithm before any 
analysis is performed). NCHS allows the use of unswapped data in its restricted access 
environment but prohibits publication of most subnational geographies when the research is 
published. 
 
The basic problem for empirical social scientists is that agencies must have a general purpose 
data publication strategy in order to provide the public good that is the reason for incurring the 
cost of data collection in the first place. But this publication strategy inherently advantages 
certain analyses over others. Statisticians and computer scientists have developed two related 
ways to address this problem: synthetic data combined with validation servers and privacy-
protected query systems. Statisticians define “synthetic data” as samples from the joint 
probability distribution of the confidential data that are released for analysis. After the researcher 
analyzes the synthetic data, the validation server is used to repeat some or all of the analyses 
on the underlying confidential data. Conventional SDL methods are used to protect the statistics 
released from the validation server. 
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Formal privacy models 
Computer scientists define a privacy-protected query system as one in which all analyses of the 
confidential data are passed through a noise-infusion filter before they are published. Some of 
these systems use input noise infusion--the confidential data are permanently altered at the 
record level, and then all analyses are done on the protected data. Other formally private 
systems apply output noise infusion to the results of statistical analyses before they are 
released. 
 
All formal privacy models define a cumulative, global privacy loss associated with all of the 
publications released from a given confidential database. This is called the total privacy-loss 
budget. The budget can then be allocated to each of the released queries. Once the budget is 
exhausted, no more analyses can be conducted. The researcher must decide how much of the 
privacy-loss budget to spend on each query--producing noisy answers to many queries or sharp 
answers to a few. The agency must decide the total privacy-loss budget for all queries and how 
to allocate it among competing potential users. 
 
An increasing number of modern SDL and formal privacy procedures replace methods like 
deterministic suppression and targeted random swapping with some form of noisy query 
system. Over the last decade these approaches have moved to the forefront because they 
provide the agency with a formal method of quantifying the global disclosure risk in the output 
and of evaluating the data quality along dimensions that are broadly relevant. 
 
Relatively recently, formal privacy models have emerged from the literature on database 
security and cryptography. In formal privacy models, the data are distorted by a randomized 
mechanism prior to publication. The goal is to explicitly characterize, given a particular 
mechanism, how much private information is leaked to data users. 
 
Differential privacy is a particularly prominent and useful approach to characterizing formal 
privacy guarantees. Briefly, a formal privacy mechanism that grants ε-differential privacy places 
an upper bound, parameterized by ε, on the ability of a user to infer from the published output 
whether any specific data item, or response, was in the original, confidential data (see Dwork & 
Roth 2014 for an in depth discussion). 
 
Formal privacy models are very intriguing because they solve two key challenges for disclosure 
limitation. First, formal privacy models by definition provide provable guarantees on how much 
privacy is lost, in a probabilistic sense, in any given data publication. Second, the privacy 
guarantee does not require that the implementation details, specifically the parameter ε, be kept 
secret. This allows researchers using data published under formal privacy models to conduct 
fully SDL-aware analysis. This is not the case with many traditional disclosure limitation 
methods which require that key parameters, such as the swap rate, suppression rate, or 
variance of noise, not be made available to data users (Abowd & Schmutte 2015). 
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Confidentiality protection in linked data: Examples 
To illustrate the application of new disclosure avoidance techniques, we describe three 
examples of linked data and the means by which confidentiality protection is applied to each. 
First, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) links extensive survey information to 
respondents’ administrative data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). To protect confidentiality in the linked HRS-SSA 
data, its data custodians use a combination of restrictive licensing agreements, physical 
security, and restrictions on model output.  Our second example is the Census Bureau’s Survey 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which has also been linked to earnings data from 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and benefit data from the SSA. Census makes the linked 
data available to researchers as the SIPP Synthetic Beta File. Researchers can directly 
access synthetic data via a restricted server and, once their analysis is ready, request output 
based on the original harmonized confidential data via a validation server. Finally, the 
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program (LEHD) at the Census Bureau links 
data provided by 51 state administrations to data from federal agencies and surveys and 
censuses on businesses, households, and people conducted by the Census Bureau. Tabular 
summaries of LEHD are published with greater detail than most business and demographic 
data. The LEHD is also accessible in restricted enclaves, but there are also restrictions on the 
output researchers can release. There are many other linked data sources. These three are 
each innovative in some fashion, and allow us to illustrate the issues faced when devising 
disclosure avoidance methods for linked data. 
HRS-SSA 
Data description 
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Michigan. Data collection was launched in 1992 and has re-interviewed the original 
sample of respondents every two years since then. New cohorts and sample refreshment have 
made the HRS one of the largest representative longitudinal samples of Americans over 50, 
with over 26,000 respondents in a given wave (Sonnega & Weir 2014). In 2006, the HRS 
started collecting measures of physical function, biomarkers, and DNA samples. The collection 
of these additional sensitive attributes reinforce confidentiality concerns.  
Linkages to other data  
The HRS team requests permission from respondents to link their survey responses to other 
data resources, as described below. For consenting respondents, HRS data are linked at the 
individual level to administrative records from Social Security and Medicare claims, thus 
allowing for detailed characterizations of income and wealth over time. 
 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) maintain claims records for the medical 
services received by essentially all Americans age 65 and older and those less than 65 years 
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who receive Medicare benefits. These records include comprehensive information about 
hospital stays, outpatient services, physician services, home health care, and hospice care. 
When linked to the HRS interview data, this supplementary information provides far more detail 
on the health circumstances and medical treatments received by HRS participants than would 
otherwise be available. 
 
Data from HRS interviews are also linked to information about respondents’ employers. This 
improves information on employer-provided benefits, including pensions. While most pension-
eligible workers have some idea of the benefits available through their pension plans, they 
generally are not knowledgeable about detailed provisions of the plans. By linking HRS 
interview data with detailed information on pension plans, researchers can better understand 
the contribution of the pension to economic circumstances and the effects of the pension 
structure on work and retirement decisions. 
        
Sidebar: Select administrative data linked to HRS 
CMS  
HRS Medicare Claims and Summary Data (2012) Cross-Reference 
SSA Administrative Data  
Cross-Wave Social Security Weights 
Supplemental Security Income [Respondent; Deceased Spouse] 
Deceased Spouse Cross-Year Benefits 
Respondent Cross-Year Benefits 
Respondent Cross-Year Summary Earnings 
Respondent Cross-Year Detail Earnings 
Deceased Spouse Cross-Year Summary Earnings 
Deceased Spouse Cross-Year Detail Earnings 
Form 831 Disability Records [Respondent; Deceased Spouse] 
Source: http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/index.php?p=reslis, as of August 2016 
 
HRS data are also linked at the individual level to administrative records from Social Security 
and Medicare, Veteran’s Administration, the National Death Index, and employer-provided 
pension plan information (Sonnega & Weir 2014). 
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Disclosure avoidance methods 
To ensure privacy and confidentiality, all study participants’ names, addresses, and contact 
information are maintained in a secure control file.4 Anyone with access to identifying 
information must sign a pledge of confidentiality. The survey data are only released to the 
research community after undergoing a rigorous process to remove or mask any identifying 
information. First a set of sensitive variables (such as state of residence or specific occupation) 
are suppressed or masked. Next, the remaining variables are tested for any possible identifying 
content. When testing is complete, the data files are subject to final review and approval by the 
HRS Data Release Protocol Committee. Data ready for public use are made available to 
qualified researchers via a secure website. Registration is required of all researchers before 
downloading files for analyses. In addition, use of linked data from other sources, such as Social 
Security or Medicare records, is strictly controlled under special agreements with specially 
approved researchers operating in secure computing environments that are periodically audited 
for compliance.  
 
Additional protections involve distortion of the microdata prior to dissemination to researchers. 
Earnings and benefits variables such as those from SSA in the HRS are rounded or top coded 
(Deang & Davies 2009). Similarly, geographic classifications are limited to broad levels of 
aggregation (for example, census divisions instead of states, or states instead of counties).  
The HRS uses licensing as its primary method of giving access to restricted files. A license can 
be secured only after meeting a stringent set of criteria that leads to a contractual agreement 
between the HRS, the researcher, and the researcher’s employer. The license enables the user 
to receive restricted files and use them at the researcher's own institutional facility. 
SIPP-SSA-IRS (SSB) 
Data description 
The SIPP/SSA/IRS Public Use File, known as the SIPP Synthetic Beta File or SSB, combines 
variables from the Census Bureau’s SIPP, the IRS individual lifetime earnings data, and the 
SSA individual benefit data.  Aimed at a user community that was primarily interested in national 
retirement and disability programs, the selection of variables for the proposed SIPP/SSA/IRS-
PUF focused on the critical demographic data to be supplied from the SIPP, earnings histories 
going back to 1937 from the IRS data maintained at SSA, and benefit data from SSA’s master 
beneficiary records, linked using respondents’ Social Security Numbers. After attempting to 
determine the feasibility of adding a limited number of variables from the SIPP directly to the 
linked earnings and benefit data, it was decided that the set of variables that could be added 
without compromising the confidentiality protection of the existing SIPP public use files was so 
limited that alternative methods had to be used to create a useful new file. 
 
                                               
4 (National Institute on Aging and the National Institutes of Health n.d.) 
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The technique adopted is called partially synthetic data with multiple imputation of missing 
items. As the term is used in this chapter, “partially synthetic data” means the person-level 
records are released containing some variables from the actual responses and other variables 
where the actual responses have been replaced by values sampled from the posterior predictive 
distribution for that record, conditional on all of the confidential data. From 2003 until 2015, 
seven preliminary versions of the SSB were produced. In this chapter, we will focus on the 
protections that pertain to the linked nature of the data. The interested reader is referred to 
(Abowd et al. 2006) for details on data sources, imputation, and linkage. The analysis here is for 
the SSB version 4. Since version 4, two additional versions have been released with slightly 
different structure.5 Subsequent versions are well-illustrated by the extensive analysis described 
here. 
Disclosure avoidance methods 
The existence of SIPP public use files poses a key challenge for disclosure avoidance. To 
protect the confidentiality of survey respondents, it was deemed necessary to prevent re-
identification of a record that appears in the synthetic data against the existing SIPP public use 
files. Hence, all information regarding the dating of variables whose source was a SIPP 
response, and not administrative data, has to be made consistent across individuals regardless 
of the panel and wave from which the response was taken. The public use file contains several 
variables that were never missing and are not synthesized. These variables are: gender, marital 
status, spouse’s gender, initial type of Social Security benefits, type of Social Security benefits 
in 2000, and the same benefit type variables for the spouse. All other variables in the SSB v4 
were synthesized.  
 
The model first imputes any missing data, then synthesizes the completed data (Reiter 2004). 
For each iteration of the missing data imputation phase and again during the synthesis phase, a 
joint posterior predictive distribution for all of the required variables is estimated according to the 
following protocol. At each node of the parent/child tree, a statistical model is estimated for each 
of the variables at the same level. The statistical model is a Bayesian bootstrap, logistic 
regression, or linear regression (possibly with transformed inputs). The missing data phase 
included nine iterations of estimation. The synthetic data phase occurred on the tenth iteration. 
Four missing data implicates were created. These constitute the completed data files that are 
the inputs to the synthesis phase. Four synthetic implicates were created for each missing data 
implicate, for a total of 16 synthetic implicates on the released file. Because copying the final 
weight to each implicate of the synthetic data would have provided an additional unsynthesized 
variable with 55,552 distinct values, the disclosure risk associated with the weight variable had 
to be addressed. A synthetic weight using a posterior predictive distribution based on the 
Multinomial/Dirichlet natural conjugate likelihood and prior was created.  
                                               
5 The latest version as of this writing is version 6.0.2 (U.S. Census Bureau 2015). 
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Disclosure avoidance assessment  
The link of administrative earnings, benefits and SIPP data adds a significant amount of 
information to an already very detailed survey and could pose potential disclosure risks beyond 
those originally managed as part of the regular SIPP public use file disclosure avoidance 
process. The synthesis of the earnings data meets the IRS disclosure officer’s criteria for 
properly protecting the federal tax information found in the summary and detailed earnings 
histories used to create the longitudinal earnings variables. 
 
The Census Bureau Disclosure Review Board at the time of release used two standards for 
disclosure avoidance in partially synthetic data. First, using the best available matching 
technology, the percentage of true matches relative to the size of the files should not be 
excessively large. Second, the ratio of true matches to the total number of matches (true and 
false) should be close to one-half.  
 
The disclosure avoidance analysis (Abowd et al. 2006) uses the principle that a potential 
intruder would first try to re-identify the source record for a given synthetic data observation in 
the existing SIPP public use files. Two distinct matching exercises - one probabilistic (Fellegi & 
Sunter 1969), one distance-based (Torra et al. 2006) - between the synthetic data and the 
harmonized confidential data were conducted.6 The harmonized confidential data -- actual 
values of the data items as released in the original SIPP public use files -- are the equivalent of 
the best available information for an intruder attempting to re-identify a record in the synthetic 
data. Successful matches between the harmonized confidential data and the synthetic data 
represent potential disclosure risks. In practice, the intruder would also need to make another 
successful link to exogenous data files that contain direct identifiers such as names, addresses, 
telephone numbers, etc. The results from the experiments are conservative estimates of re-
identification risk. For the probabilistic matching, the assessment matched synthetic and 
confidential files exactly on the unsynthesized variables of gender and marital status, and 
success of the matching exercise is assessed using a person identifier which is not, in fact, 
available in the released version of the synthetic data.  Without the personid, an intruder would 
have to compare many more record pairs to find true matches, would not find any more true 
matches (the true match is guaranteed to be in the blocks being compared), and would almost 
certainly find more false matches. In fact, the records that can be re-identified represent only a 
very small proportion (less than three percent) of candidate records, and correct re-
identifications are swamped by a sea of false re-identifications (Abowd et al. 2006, p.6).  
 
In distance-based matching, records between the harmonized confidential and synthetic data 
are blocked in a similar way, and distances (or similarity scores) are computed for a given 
confidential record and every synthetic record within a block. The three closest records are 
                                               
6 In much of the documentation for the SSB, the internal confidential files, harmonized across the SIPP 
panets and waves, and completed using the multiple imputation procedures that produced the four 
implicates at the root of the synthesis for confidentiality protection, are called the “Gold Standard” files. 
This nomenclature means that these are the files that would be provided to a researcher in the Census 
Bureau’s restricted access environment (FSRDC). Chapter 9 in this volume discusses linking 
methodologies. 
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declared matches, and the personid again checked to verify how often a true match is obtained. 
A putative intruder who treated the closest record as a match would correctly link about 1 
percent of all synthetic records, and less than 3% in the worst-case sub-group (Abowd et al. 
2006, p.8).  
Analytical validity assessment 
Although synthetic data are designed to solve a confidentiality protection problem, the success 
of this solution is measured by both the degree of protection provided and the user’s ability to 
reliably estimate scientifically interesting quantities. The latter property of the synthetic data is 
known as analytical (or statistical) validity. Analytical validity exists when, at a minimum, 
estimands can be estimated without bias and their confidence intervals (or the nominal level of 
significance for hypothesis tests) can be stated accurately (Rubin 1987). To verify analytical 
validity, the confidence intervals surrounding the point estimates obtained from confidential and 
synthetic data should completely overlap (Reiter et al. 2009), presumably with the synthetic 
confidence interval being slightly larger because of the increased variation arising from the 
synthesis. When these results obtain, inferences drawn about the coefficients will be consistent 
whether one uses synthetic or completed data. 
 
As an example, Figure 17 compares employment rates for black men and women.8 The 
estimated percentage of individuals who worked in a given year is very close, on average, for 
both groups and across all the years. The confidence intervals overlap for most years. Similar 
results obtain for whites, as well as for average earnings for all the groups (see Abowd et al. 
2006 for additional statistics).  
 
Similar comparisons can be made for model-based results. Figure 2 reports coefficients from 
regressions of the log of total earnings9 in the year 2000 on various explanatory variables, by 
sex for blacks. The closest correspondence between the synthetic and completed regression 
coefficients is in the education variables, which always have the same sign and generally have 
significant overlap in the confidence intervals. The exceptions for overlapping confidence 
intervals are usually the graduate degree indicator. Other SIPP demographic variables are not 
as consistently similar between the synthetic and completed data, but generally, there is some 
degree of overlap between confidence intervals, suggesting that the synthetic data are not 




                                               
7 All data underlying these and other graphs, with one exception, have been made available at Vilhuber et 
al (2017). 
8 Strictly speaking, the statistics are for indicators of positive FICA-covered earnings on the SSA-provided 
Summary Earnings Records (SER) for individuals who became OASDI beneficiaries during the time 
period covered by these data i.e., had date of initial entitlement between 1951 and 2002 (Abowd et al. 
2006, Table 3-9). 
9 Strictly speaking, sum of deferred and non-deferred earnings at FICA and non-FICA jobs on the 





Figure 1: Comparison of employment rate, estimated from completed (confidential) data and from synthetic 
data, for black men and women. (Source: Abowd et al. 2006, Tables 3, 5, 7, 9) 
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Sidebox: Practical Synthetic Data Use 
The SIPP-SSA-IRS Synthetic Beta File is accessible to users in its current form 
since 2010. Interested users can request an account by following links at 
https://www.vrdc.cornell.edu/sds/. Applications are judged solely on feasibility 
(i.e., the necessary variables are on the SSB). After projects are approved by 
the Census Bureau, researchers will be given accounts on the Synthetic Data 
Server. Users can submit validation requests, following certain rules, outlined 
on the Census Bureau's website. Deviations from the guidelines may be 
Figure 2: Coefficients of regression of log earnings on various variables, black men and women, year 2000. (Source: 
Abowd et al. 2006, Table 41, 43) 
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possible with prior approval of the Census Bureau, but are typically only 
granted if specialized software is needed (other than SAS or Stata), and only if 
said software also already exists on Census Bureau computing systems. 
Between 2010 and 2016, over one hundred users requested access to the 
server, using a succession of continuously improved datasets. 
 
 
LEHD: Linked establishment and employee records 
Data description 
The LEHD data links employee wage records extracted from Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
administrative files from 51 states with establishment-level records from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (also provided by the partner states), the SSA-sourced record of 
applications for Social Security Numbers (“Numident”), residential addresses derived from IRS-
provided individual tax filings, and data from surveys and censuses conducted by the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2000 and 2010 decennial censuses, as well as microdata from the ACS). 
Additional information is linked in from the Census Bureau's Employer Business Register and its 
derivative files. The merged data are subject both to U.S.C. Title 13 and Title 26 protections. For 
many more details, see (Abowd et al. 2004; Abowd et al. 2009). 
 
From the data, multiple output products are generated. The Quarterly Workforce Indicators 
(QWI) provide local estimates of a variety of employment and earnings indicators, such as job 
creation, job destruction, new hires, separations, worker turnover, and monthly earnings, for 
detailed person and establishment characteristics, such as age, gender, firm age, and firm size 
(Abowd et al. 2009). The first QWI were released in 2003. The data are used for a variety of 
analyses and research, emphasizing detailed local data on demographic labor market variables 
(e.g. Gittings & Schmutte 2016; Abowd & Vilhuber 2012). Based on the same input data, the 
LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (LODES) describe the geographic distribution 
of jobs according to the place of employment and the place of worker residence (Center for 
Economic Studies 2016). New job-to-job flow statistics measure the movement of jobs and 
workers across industries and regional labor markets (Hyatt et al. 2014). The microdata 
underlying these products is heavily used in research, since it provides nearly universal 
coverage of U.S. workers observed at quarterly frequencies. Snapshots of the statistical 
production database are made available to researchers regularly (McKinney & Vilhuber 2008; 
McKinney & Vilhuber 2011; Vilhuber & McKinney 2014). 
Disclosure avoidance methods 
We describe in detail the disclosure avoidance method used for workplace tabulations in QWI 
and LODES (Abowd et al. 2012). Not discussed here are the additional disclosure avoidance 
methods applied in advance of publishing data on job flows (Abowd & McKinney 2016). 
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Focusing on QWI and LODES is sufficient to highlight the types of confidentiality concerns that 
arise from working with these linked data, and the kinds of strategies the Census Bureau uses 
to address them. 
 
In the QWI confidentiality protection scheme, confidential micro-data are considered protected 
by noise infusion if one of the following conditions holds: (1) any inference regarding the 
magnitude of a particular respondent’s data must differ from the confidential quantity by at least 
c% even if that inference is made by a coalition of respondents with exact knowledge of their 
own answers (FCSM 2005, p.72), or (2) any inference regarding the magnitude of an item is 
incorrect with probability no less than y%, where c and y are confidential but generally “large.” 
Condition (1) is intended to prevent, say, a group of firms from “backing out” the total payroll of a 
specific competitor by combining their private information with the published total. Condition (2) 
prevents inference of counts of the number of workers or firms that satisfy some condition (say, 
the number of teenage workers employed in the fast food industry in Hull, GA) assuming item 
suppression or some additional protection, like synthetic data, when the count is too small. 
 
Complying with these conditions involves the application of statistical disclosure limitation 
throughout the data production process. It starts with the job-level data that record 
characteristics of the employment match between a specific individual and a specific workplace, 
or establishment, at a specific point in time. When the job-level data are aggregated to the 
establishment level, the QWI system adds statistical noise. This noise is designed to have three 
important properties. First, every job-level data point is distorted by some minimum amount. 
Second, for a given workplace, the data are always distorted in the same direction (increased or 
decreased) and by the same percentage magnitude in every period. Third, when the estimates 
are aggregated, the distortions added to individual data points tend to cancel out in a manner 
that preserves the cross-sectional and time-series properties of the data. The chosen 
distribution is a ramp distribution centered on unity, with a distortion of at least a% and at most 
b% (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Ramp distribution used in LEHD disclosure avoidance system 
All published data from QWI use the same noise-distorted data, and any special tabulations 
released from the QWI must follow the same procedures. The QWI system extends the idea of 
multiplicative noise infusion as a cross-sectional confidentiality protection mechanism first 
proposed by (Evans et al. 1998). A similar noise-infusion process has been used since 2007 to 
protect the confidentiality of data underlying the Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns 
(Massell & Funk 2007) and was tested for application to the Commodity Flow Survey (Massell et 
al. 2006). 
 
In addition to noise infusion, the QWI confidentiality protection system uses weighting, which 
introduces an additional difference between the confidential data item and the released data 
item.  Finally, when a statistic meant to be published turns out to be based on data from fewer 
than three persons or establishments, it is suppressed. Suppression is only used when the 
combination of noise infusion and weighting may not distort the publication data with a high 
enough probability to meet the criteria laid out above; however the suppression rate is much 
lower than in comparable tabular publications, such as the QCEW.10  An alternative to 
suppression (proposed by Gittings 2009; Abowd et al. 2012) uses a synthetic data model that 
replaces suppressed values with samples drawn from an appropriate posterior predictive 
distribution. The hybrid system incorporating both noise-infused and synthetic data allows the 
release of data without suppressions. The confidentiality protection provided by the hybrid 
system without suppressions is comparable to the protection afforded by the system using the 
noise infusion system with suppressions, but the analytical validity of the data produced by the 
hybrid system is improved because the synthetic data are better than the best inference an 
external user can make regarding the suppressions (Gittings 2009). 
                                               
10  Not all estimates are subject to suppression. Estimates such as employment are subject to 
suppression. Continuous dollar measures like payroll are not (Abowd et al. 2009; Abowd et al. 2012). 
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The LEHD Origin-Destination Economic Statistics (LODES) provides aggregated information on 
where workers are employed (Destinations) and where they live (Origins), along with the 
characteristics of those places. As the name implies, the data are intended for use in 
understanding commuting patterns and the nature of local labor markets. The fundamental 
geographic unit in LODES is a Census block, and thus much more detailed than QWI for which 
data are published as county-level aggregates. LODES is tabulated from the same microdata as 
the QWI, and for workplaces (the destination), uses a variation of the QWI noise infusion 
technique. Cells that do not meet the publication criteria of the QWI continue to be suppressed 
in LODES, but are replaced using synthetic data.11 For residences (the origin), the protection 
system relies on a provably-private synthetic data model (Machanavajjhala et al. 2008). A 
statistical model is built from the data, as the posterior predictive distribution (PPD) of release 
data X’ given the confidential data X: Pr[X’|X]. Synthetic data points are sampled from the model 
X’, and released. In general, to satisfy differential privacy (Dwork 2006; Dwork et al. 2006, 
2017), the amount of noise that must be injected into the synthetic data model is quite large, 
typically rendering the releasable data of low utility. The novelty of the LODES protection 
system was to introduce the concept of “probabilistic differential privacy,” and early variant of 
what are now called approximate differential privacy systems. By allowing the differential privacy 
guarantee (parametrized by 𝜀) to fail in certain rare cases (which occur with probability 𝛿), (𝜖, 𝛿)-
probabilistic differential privacy (Machanavajjhala et al. 2008) improves the analytical validity of 
the data greatly. LODES uses Census tract-to-tract relations to estimate the PPD for the block-
to-block model. A unique model is estimated for each block, recovering the likelihood of a place 
of residence conditional on place of work and characteristics of the workers and the workplaces. 
Several additional measures further improve the privacy and analytical validity of the model (see 
Machanavajjhala et al. 2008 for further details). The resulting privacy-preserving algorithm 
guarantees 𝜖-differential privacy of 8.99 with 99.999999% confidence (𝛿 = 10−6). 
Disclosure avoidance assessment for QWI 
The extent of the protection of the QWI micro-data can be measured in two ways: showing the 
percentage deviation as a measure of the uncertainty about the true value that one can infer 
from the released value, and the amount of reallocation of small cells (less than 5 entities in a 
tabulation cell).12 Each cell underlying the tabulation is for a statistic 𝑋𝑘𝑡where k is a cell defined 
by a combination of age, gender, industry, and county, and for all released time periods for the 
states at the time of these experiments.13 A comparison of the undistorted, unweighted data with 
                                               
11 Similar methods have been discussed for the QWI (Abowd et al. 2012; Gittings 2009), but not yet 
implemented.  
12 The comparisons were computed using custom internal tabulations as well as published numbers, for 
two states (Illinois and Maryland). Only Maryland is reported here. 
13 The disclosure avoidance assessment was run when first releasing the QWI, in 2003, and are 
reproduced here as they were presented to the Disclosure Review Board then. At the time, QWI were 
available for industry classifications according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), 1987 
definitions. Modern QWI are available for North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), 2012 
definitions. The basic conclusion does not change. 
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the published data for 𝑋 = 𝐵 (Table 1) illustrates the combined contribution of weighting, noise 
infusion, and item suppression.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of unweighted confidential tabulations against published tabulations, QWI 
 Published count 
Unweighted 
count Suppressed 0 1 2 3 4 
5 or 
more 
0 1.06 98.94 0 0 0 0 0 
1 99.9 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 
2 85.71 0.04 0 0 13.9 0.32 0.02 
3 23.54 0.03 0 0 40.18 33.6 2.65 
4 18.06 0.02 0 0 2.22 33.67 46.04 
5 or more 8.44 0.01 0 0 0.02 0.26 91.26 
        
Total number of cells: 4,659,408, Maryland, 2003. Source: Abowd et al, 2012. 
 
The table entries can be interpreted as the conditional probabilities of publishing the column 
entry given the confidential row entry. The table is therefore also informative about how much 
can be learned about the confidential entry from the published data. Table 1 also reports the 
amount of suppression after weighting and noise-infusion as it relates to the original raw value. 
All single-individual cells are suppressed. This is not true for two-person cells, some of which 
have a weighted value that lies above the suppression threshold, in which case the weighted 
estimate is released. The converse is true for cells with three individuals. Due to weighting, 
some of these cells have weighted, undistorted values that lie below the suppression threshold, 
and are consequently suppressed. Cells that contain count data based on fewer than three firms 
also generate suppressions, which are included in the suppression totals. Overall, at the level of 
detail analyzed here (SIC3 × county × time × sex × age), around 25% of the beginning of period 
employment cells are suppressed. For more aggregate tabulations, for instance at the SIC 
Division level, that percentage falls to between 5% and 10%. Note that there are never any 
complementary suppressions. 
 
Total payroll, on the other hand, is a dollar magnitude, not an employment count, and is never 
suppressed. The combination of weighting and distortion is sufficient to protect the 
confidentiality of this item without suppression because if the item is based on a single person 
or establishment, then the minimum distortion of the underlying micro-data applies. If the item is 
based on 2 employers or establishments then both micro-data items have been distorted by at 
least the minimum percentage. Knowledge of one’s own value does not help in inferring 
another’s value because both data items were distorted in an unknown direction by an unknown 
minimum percentage. Even an accurate inference about one’s own distortion factor supplies no 
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information about the other parties’ distortion factor, thus protecting that item by at least the 
minimum distortion factor in each direction. 
Analytical validity assessment for QWI 
The noise infusion algorithm for QWI is designed to preserve validity of the data for particular 
analysis tasks. We demonstrate analytical validity using two statistics: time-series properties of 
the distorted data relative to the confidential data of several estimates, and the cross-sectional 
unbiasedness of the published data for beginning-of-quarter employment B. The unit of analysis 
is an interior sub-state geography × industry × age × sex cell kt.14 Analytical validity is obtained 
when the data display no bias and the additional dispersion due to the confidentiality protection 
system can be quantified so that statistical inferences can be adjusted to accommodate it.  
Time-series properties of distorted data 
We estimate an AR(1) for the time series associated with each cell kt. For each cell, the error 
𝛥𝑟 =  𝑟 − 𝑟∗ is computed, where r and 𝑟∗are the first-order serial correlation coefficient 
computing using confidential data and protected data, respectively. Table 2 shows the 
distribution of the errors ∆r across SIC-division × county cells, for accessions A, beginning-of-
quarter employment B, full-quarter employment F, net job flows JF, and separations S (for 
additional tables, see Abowd et al. 2012). The table shows that the time series properties of the 
QWI remain largely unaffected by the distortion. The central tendency of the bias (as measured 
by the median of the ∆r distribution) is never greater than 0.001, and the error distribution is 
tight: the semi-interquartile range of the distortion for B in Table 2 is 0.022, which is less than 
the precision with which estimated serial correlation coefficients are normally displayed.15 The 
overall spread of the distribution is slightly higher when considering two-digit SIC × county and 
three-digit SIC × county cells (not reported here), due to the greater sparsity. The time series 
properties of the QWI data are unbiased. The small amount additional noise in the time series 
statistics is, in general, economically meaningless.  
 
                                               
14 Sub-state geography in all cases is a county, whereas the industry classification is the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC 1987).  








Accessions -0.000542 0.026314 
Beginning-of-Quarter Employment 0.000230 0.021775 
Full-Quarter Employment 0.000279 0.018830 
Net Job Flows -0.000025 0.002288 
Separations 0.000797 0.025539 
 
Cross-sectional unbiasedness of the distorted data 
The distribution of the infused noise is symmetric, and allocation of the noise factors is random. 
The data distribution resulting from the noise infusion should thus be unbiased. We compute the 
bias ∆X in each cell kt, expressed in percentage terms: 
 
Evidence of unbiasedness is provided by Figure 4, which shows the distribution of the bias for X 
=B. 16 The distribution of ∆B has most mass around the mode at zero percent. Also, as is to be 
expected, secondary spikes are present around ±c, the inner bound of the noise distribution. 
  
 
                                               
16 Data for Maryland. For additional variables and states, see (Abowd et al. 2012). All histograms are 
weighted by Bkt. Industry classification is three-digit SIC (industry groups). 
Figure 4: Distribution of ∆B in Maryland. For details, see text. 
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Sidebox: Do-it-yourself noise 
infusion 
The interested user might 
consult a simple example (with 
fake data) at 
https://github.com/labordynami
csinstitute/rampnoise  (Vilhuber 
2017) that illustrates this 
mechanism. 
Physical and legal protections 
The provision of very detailed micro-tabulations or public-use microdata may not be sufficient to 
inform certain types of research questions. In particular, for business data the thresholds that 
trigger SDL suppression methods are met far more often than for individuals or households. In 
those cases, the research community needs controlled access to confidential microdata. Three 
key reasons why access to microdata may be beneficial are: 
  
(i)        “microdata permit policy makers to pose and analyze complex questions. In 
economics, for example, analysis of aggregate statistics does not give a sufficiently 
accurate view of the functioning of the economy to allow analysis of the components of 
productivity growth; 
(ii)    access to microdata permits analysts to calculate marginal rather than just average 
effects. For example, microdata enable analysts to do multivariate regressions 
whereby the marginal impact of specific variables can be isolated; 
(iii)  broadly speaking, widely available access to microdata enables replication of 
important research” (United Nations 2007, p.4) 
 
As we’ve outlined above, many of the concerns about confidentiality have either removed or 
prevented creation of public-use microdata versions of linked files, exacerbating the necessity of 
providing alternate access to the confidential microdata.  
 
NSOs and survey organizations usually provide access to confidential linked data within 
restricted-access data centers. In the United States, this means either using one of 30 secure 
sites managed by the Census Bureau as part of the Federal Statistical Research Data System 
(FSRDC),17 or going to the headquarters of the statistical agency. Similarly, in other countries, 
access is usually restricted to headquarters of NSOs. Secure enclaves managed by NSOs used 
to be rare. In the 1990s and early 2000s, an expansion of existing networks and the creation of 
new, alternate methods of accessing data housed in secure enclaves occurred in several 
countries. Access methods may be through physical travel, remote submission, or remote 
                                               
17 See https://www.census.gov/fsrdc (accessed on December 15, 2017). 
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processing. However, all methods rely on two fundamental elements. First, the researcher 
accessing the data is mostly free to choose the modelling strategy of her choice, and is not 
restricted to the tables or queries that the data curator has used for published statistics. Second, 
the output from such models is then analyzed to avoid unauthorized disclosure, and 
subsequently released to the researcher for publication. 
 
Several methods are currently used by NSOs and other data collecting agencies to provide 
access to confidential data. The following sections will describe each of them in turn.18  
Statistical data enclaves 
Statistical data enclaves, or Research Data Centers, are secure computing facilities that provide 
researchers with access to confidential microdata, while putting restrictions on the content that 
can be removed from the facility. The different advisory committees of the two largest 
professional association (American Statistical Association, ASA, and the American Economic 
Association, AEA), pushed for easier and broader access for researchers as far back as the 
1960s, though the emphasis then was on the avoiding the cost of making special tabulations. 
The AEA suggested creating Census data centers at selected universities (Kraus 2013). In the 
1990s and early 2000s, similar networks started in other countries. In Canada, the Canadian 
Foundation for Innovation (CFI) awarded a number of grants to open research data centers, 
with the first opening at McMaster University (Hamilton, Ontario) in 2000.19 The creation of the 
RDCs was specifically motivated by the inability to ensure confidentiality while providing 
usability of longitudinally linked survey data (Currie & Fortin 2015). 
 
In the United States, a 2004 grant by the National Science Foundation laid the groundwork for 
subsequent expansion of the (then Census) Research Data Center network from eight 
locations, open since the mid-1990s, to over 30 locations in 2017. One of the key motivations 
was to make the newly available linked administrative data at LEHD accessible to researchers. 
The network operates under physical security constraints managed by the Census Bureau and 
the Internal Revenue Service, in locations that are considered part of the Census Bureau itself, 
and staffed by Census Bureau employees.  
 
Statistical data enclaves can be central locations, in which a single location at the statistical 
agency is made available to approved researchers. In the U.S., NCHS and BLS follow this 
model, in addition to using the FSRDC network. In Canada, business data can be accessed at 
Statistics Canada headquarters, while other data may be accessed both there and at the 
geographically dispersed RDCs, which obtain physical copies of the confidential data. 
 
Some facilities are hybrid facilities. The statistical processing occurs at a central location, but 
the secure remote access facilities are distributed geographically. The U.S. FSRDCs have 
worked this way since the early 2000s. A central computing facility is housed in the Census 
Bureau’s primary data center. Secure remote access is provided to approved researchers at 
                                               
18 The section draws on (Weinberg et al. 2007; Vilhuber 2013). 
19 For an extensive history of the Canadian Research Data Center Network, see (Currie & Fortin 2015). 
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designated sites throughout the county, namely the FSRDCs. Each of the FSRDC sites is a 
secure Census Bureau facility that is physically located on controlled premises provided by the 
partner organization, often a university or Federal Reserve Bank. The German IAB locates 
certified thin clients in dedicated rooms at partner institutions. Secure spaces are costly to build 
and certify. Recently, institutions in the UK have attempted to reduce the cost by commoditizing 
such secure spaces (Raab et al. 2015). In France, the Centre d'accès sécurisé distant aux 
données (CASD) has a secure central computing facility, and allows for remote access through 
custom secure devices from designated but otherwise ordinary university offices, which satisfy 
certain physical requirements, but are not dedicated facilities. Similar arrangements are used by 
Scandinavian NSOs, as well as by survey organizations such as the HRS. Remote access to 
full desktop environments within the secure data enclave, commonly referred to as “virtual 
desktop infrastructure” (VDI), from regular laptops or workstations, is increasingly common. 
 
The location of remote access points is often limited to the country of the data provider (United 
States, Canada), or to countries with reciprocal or common enforcement mechanisms (within 
the European Union, for European NSOs). Cross-border access, even within the European 
Union, remains exceedingly rare, with only a handful of cross-border secure remote access 
points open in the European Union. The most prolific user of cross-border secure remote 
access points, as of this writing, is the German IAB, with multiple data access points in the 
United States and a recently opened one in the United Kingdom.  
Remote processing 
Two other alternative remote access mechanisms are often used: manual and automatic remote 
processing. Manual remote processing occurs when the remote “processor” is a staff member of 
the data provider. This can be as simple as sending programs in by email, or finding a co-author 
who is an employee of the data provider. The U.S. NCHS, German IAB, and Statistics Canada 
provide this type of access. Generally, the costs of manual remote processing are paid by the 
users. 
 
More sophisticated mechanisms automate some or all of the data flow. For instance, programs 
may be executed automatically based on email or web submission, but disclosure review is 
performed manually. This method is used by the IAB’s JoSuA (Institute for Employment 
Research 2016). Fully automated mechanisms, such as LISSY (Luxembourg), ANDRE (U.S. 
NCHS), DAS (U.S. NCES), Australia's Remote Access Data Laboratory (RADL), Canada’s Real 
Time Remote Access (RTRA), generally restrict the command set from the allowed statistical 
programming languages (SAS, Stata, SPSS) and limit what the users can do to certain 
statistical procedures and languages for which known automated disclosure limitation 
procedures have been implemented.  
 
Most of these systems only provide access to household and person surveys. Of the known 
systems surveyed above, only Australia's RADL systems and the Bank of Italy's implementation 
of LISSY (Bruno et al. 2009; Bruno et al. 2014) seem to provide access to business microdata 
through automated remote processing facilities.  
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Licensing 
Users of secure research data centers always sign some form of legally binding user or 
licensing agreement. These agreements describe acceptable user behavior, such as not 
copying or photographing screen contents. However, licensing alone may also be used to 
provide access to restricted-use microdata outside of formal restricted access data centers. In 
general, the detail in licensed microdata files is greater than in the equivalent (or related) public-
use file, and may allow for disclosure of confidential data if inappropriately exploited. For this 
reason, licensed microdata files tend to have several additional levels of disclosure avoidance 
methods applied, including output review in some cases. For instance, even without linkages, 
the HRS licensed files have more detailed geography on respondents (county, say, rather than 
Census region), but do not have the most detailed geography (GPS coordinates or exact 
address). Generally, the legally enforceable license imposes restrictions on what can be 
published by the researchers, and restricts who can access the data, and for what purpose. The 
contracting organization is the researcher’s university, which is subject to penalties such as loss 
of eligibility status for research grants if the license is violated.  
 
In the United States, some surveys (NCES, NLSY, HRS) use licensing to distribute portions of 
the data they collect on their respondents. Commercial data providers (COMPUSTAT, etc.) also 
license the data distributed to researchers. Penalties for license infractions range from 
restricting future research grant funding, for example in HRS, to monetary penalties, for 
example in commercial data licenses. We are not aware of any studies that quantify the 
violation rates or financial penalties actually incurred due to license violations. Licensing may be 
limited by the enforceability of laws or contracts, and thus may be limited to residents of the 
same jurisdiction in which the data provider is housed. Often, some licensing is combined with 
the creation of ad-hoc data enclaves, the simplest of these being stand-alone, non-networked 
computer workstations.  
Disclosure avoidance methods 
Data enclaves exist to allow researchers to perform analyses within the restricted environment, 
and then extract or publish some form of statistical summary that can be released from the 
secure environment. Generally, these summaries are estimates from a statistical model. In 
general, model-based output is evaluated according the same criteria traditionally used for 
tabular output (minimum number of units within a reporting cell, minimum percentage of global 
activity within a reporting cell). In contrast to licensing arrangements, which allow researchers to 
self-monitor, statistical data enclaves have regimented output monitoring, typically by staff of the 
data provider. Generally, released statistical outputs are registered in some fashion, but 
documentation of the full provenance chain may be limited. 
 
No systematic attempt has been made, to our knowledge, to measure formally the cumulative 
privacy impact of model-based releases because the science and technology for doing so are 
too immature. Remote processing facilities, on the other hand, when using automated 
mechanisms, rely on several practices to reduce the risk of disclosure. First, they limit the scope 
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of possible analyses to those for which the agency has developed safe procedures. The number 
of times a researcher may request releases may also be limited. Nevertheless, most agencies 
recognize that this review system does not scale because the infeasibility of a full accounting of 
all possible query combinations over time. In general, they apply basic disclosure avoidance 
techniques such as suppression, perturbation, masking, recoding, and bootstrap sampling of the 
input data to each project separately. Some systems apply automated analysis of log and output 
files (Schouten & Cigrang 2003), although often a manual review is also included (O’Keefe et al. 
2013). Some systems provide for self-monitored release of model results, either under licensing 
or remote access. There are also limitations on quantity and frequency of self-released results, 
combined with sampling by human reviewers. More sophisticated tools, such as perturbation or 
synthesizing of estimated model parameters, have been proposed (Reiter 2003). Finally, some 
such systems require review of the draft research paper before submission to any publication 
medium including online preprint repositories like ArXiv.org. 
 
All three of the examples of linked data provided in this paper rely on some version of secure 
data enclaves to provide microdata access to approved researchers. HRS data are made 
available to tenure-track researchers who sign a data use agreement and provide 
documentation of a secure local computing environment. An additional option for HRS data is to 
visit to the Michigan Center on the Demography of Aging data enclave, which makes data 
accessible to researchers in a physical data enclave at “headquarters,” like many NSOs. More 
recently, HRS has started to offer secure VDI access to researchers. The confidential data 
underlying the SSB, and against which validation requests are run, are also available either 
within the FSRDC network, or by sending validation requests by email to staff at Census 
headquarters (a form of “remote processing”). LEHD microdata are only available through the 
FSRDC.  
 
An open question is whether the disclosure risks addressed through physical security measures 
are greater for linked data. Enabling researchers to measure some of the heuristic disclosure 
risk such as n cell count or p-percent rule (O’Keefe et al. 2013) becomes more important when 
any possible combination of k variables (k large) leads to small cells or dominated cells. Even 
subject matter experts cannot assess these situations a priori. 
Data silos 
One concern with the increasing move to multiple distinct access points for confidential data is 
the “siloing” of data. The critical symptom is a physical separation of files in distinct secure data 
enclaves. The underlying causes are the incompatible legal restrictions on different data. 
Typically, these restrictions impose administrative barriers to combining data sources for which 
linking is technically possible.  
 
Such administrative barriers may also be driven by ethical or confidentiality concerns. The 
question of consent by survey or census respondents may explicitly prevent the linkage of their 
survey responses or of their biological specimen with other data. For example, the Canadian 
Census long form of 2006 offered respondents the option to either answer survey questions on 
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earnings, or consent to linking in their tax data on earnings. In the 2016 census, the question 
was no longer asked, and users were simply notified that linkage would happen.  
 
In the case of the LEHD data, as of December 2015, all 50 states as well as the District of 
Columbia had signed agreements with the Census Bureau to share data and produce public-
use statistics. It would thus seem possible for researchers to access a comprehensive LEHD 
jobs database through the Federal Statistical Research Data Center network, by linking together 
the job databases from 51 administrative entities. However, all but 12 of the States had declined 
to automatically extend the right to use the data to external researchers within the FSRDC 
network. Nevertheless, some of the same states that declined to provide such permission in the 
FSRDC give access to researchers through their state data centers or other means. The 
Unemployment Insurance state-level data is thus siloed, and researchers may be faced with 
non-representative data on the American job market. Several European projects, such as Data 
without Boundaries (DwB), have investigated cross-national access with elevated expectations 
but relatively limited success (Schiller & Welpton 2014; Bender & Heining 2011). Increasingly, 
the U.S. Census Bureau and CASD also host data from other data providers, through 
collaborative agreements, moving towards a reduction of the siloing of data.  
 
Secure multi-party computing may be one solution to this problem (Sanil et al. 2004; Karr et al. 
2005; Karr et al. 2006; Karr et al. 2009). However, implementation of such methods, at least in 
the domain of the social and medical sciences cooperating with NSOs, is in its infancy (Raab et 
al. 2015). The typical limitations are the throughput of the secure interconnection between the 
sources and the requirement of manual model output checking. These limitations drastically 
slow down any iterative procedure.  
Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter has been to illustrate how confidentiality protection methods can be and 
have been applied to linked administrative data. Our examples provide a guide to best-practices 
for data custodians endeavoring to walk the fine line between making data accessible and 
protecting individual privacy and confidentiality. Our examples also illustrate different paradigms 
of protection ranging from the more traditional approach of physical security to more modern 
formal privacy systems and the provision of synthetic data. 
 
In concluding, we note that from a theoretical perspective, there does not appear to be a clear 
distinction between the threats to confidentiality in linked data relative to unlinked data, or in 
survey data relative to administrative data. Richly detailed data pose disclosure risks, whether 
that richness is inherent in the data design, or comes from linkages of variables from multiple 
sources. Likewise, there are not special methods to protect confidentiality in linked versus 
unlinked data. Any data with a network, relational, panel or hierarchical structure poses special 
challenges to data providers to protect confidentiality while preserving analytical validity. Our 
example of the QWI shows one way this challenge has been successfully managed in a linked 
data setting, but the same tools could be effective in application to the QCEW, which uses the 
same frame, but does not involve worker-firm linkages. 
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However, from a legal perspective, linking two datasets can change the nature of confidentiality 
protection in a more practical manner. Any output must conform to the strongest privacy 
protections required across each of the linked datasets. For example, when the LEHD program 
links SSA data on individuals to IRS data on firms, any downstream research must comply with 
the confidentiality demands of all three agencies. Likewise, the data must conform to the U.S. 
Census Bureau publication thresholds for data involving individuals and firms. Hence, linking 
data can produce a maze of confidentiality requirements that are difficult to articulate, comply 
with, and monitor. Harmonizing or standardizing such requirements and practices across data 
providers, both public and private, and across jurisdictions would be helpful. Privacy and 
confidentiality issues also invite updated and continuing research on the demand for privacy 
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Appendix: Technical Terms and Acronyms 
Data  
● ACS - American Community Survey, a large survey conducted continuously by the US 
Census Bureau, on topics such as  jobs and occupations, educational attainment, 
veterans, housing characteristics, and several other topics 
(https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/) 
● BDS - Business Dynamics Statistics, produced by the U.S. Census Bureau, see 
www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/ for more details. 
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● CBP - County Business Patterns, produced by the U.S. Census Bureau, see 
www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html  for more details. 
● COEP - Canadian Out-of-Employment Panel, a survey initially conducted by McMaster 
University in Canada, subsequently taken over by the Statistics Canada (Browning et al. 
1995) 
● COMPUSTAT - a commercial database maintained by Standard and Poor's, with 
information on companies in the US and around the world (http://www.compustat.com/).  
● HRS - Health and Retirement Study, a long-running survey run by the Institute for Social 
Research at the University of Michigan in the United States on aging in the US 
population (http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/) 
● LEHD - Longitudinal Employer Household Program at the U.S. Census Bureau, which 
links data provided by 51 state administrations to data from federal agencies and 
surveys (https://lehd.ces.census.gov/) 
● LODES - LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics describe the geographic 
distribution of jobs according to the place of employment and the place of worker 
residence, in part through the flagship webapp OnTheMap 
(https://onthemap.ces.census.gov/)  
● QWI - Quarterly Workforce Indicators, a set of local statistics of employment and 
earnings, produced by the Census Bureau's LEHD program 
(https://lehd.ces.census.gov/data/)  
● SIPP - Survey of Income and Program Participation is conducted by the U.S. Census 
Bureau on topics such as economic well-being, health insurance, and food security 
(https://www.census.gov/sipp/).  
● SSB - the SIPP Synthetic Beta File, also known as “SIPP/SSA/IRS Public Use File” 
Other Abbreviations 
● ABS - Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Australian NSO (http://abs.gov.au/)  
● AEA – American Economic Association (https://www.aeaweb.org) 
● ASA - American Statistical Association (https://www.amstat.org) 
● BLS - Bureau of Labor Statistics, the NSO in the United States providing data on “labor 
market activity, working conditions, and price changes in the economy.” (https://bls.gov) 
● CASD - Centre d'accès sécurisé distant aux données, the French remote access system 
to most administrative data files (https://casd.eu)  
● Census Bureau - the largest statistical agency in the United States (https://census.gov)  
● CMS - Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services administers US government health 
programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and others (https://cms.gov/). 
● EIA - Energy Information Agency, collecting and disseminating information on energy 
generation and consumption in the United States (https://eia.gov). 
● FICA - Federal Insurance Contribution Act, the law regulating the system of social 
security benefits in the United States 
● IAB - Institute for Employment Research at the German Ministry of Labor 
(http://iab.de/en/iab-aktuell.aspx). 
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● FSRDC - Federal Statistical Research Data Centers were originally created as the U.S. 
Census Bureau Research Data Centers. They provide secure facilities for authorized 
remote access government restricted-use microdata, and are structured as partnerships 
between federal statistical agencies and research institutions 
(https://www.census.gov/fsrdc).  
● IRS - Internal Revenue Service handles tax collection for the US government 
(https://irs.gov)  
● NCHS - National Center for Health Statistics, the US NSO charged with collecting and 
disseminating information on health and well-being (https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/).  
● NSO - National statistical offices. Most countries have a single national statistical 
agency, but some countries (USA, Germany) have multiple statistical agencies. 
● OASDI - Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance program, the official name for 
Social Security in the United States 
● QCEW - Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages is a program run by the BLS, 
collecting firm-level reports of employment and wages, and publishing quarterly 
estimates for about 95% of US jobs (https://www.bls.gov/cew/)  
● SER - Summary Earnings Records on SSA data 
● SSA - Social Security Administration, administers government-provided retirement, 
disability, and survivors benefits in the United States (https://ssa.gov) 
● SSN - Social Security Number, an identification number in the United States, originally 
used for management of benefits administered by the Social Security Administration, but 
since expanded and serving as a quasi-national identifier number.   
● UI - Unemployment Insurance, which in the United States are administered by each of 
the states (and District of Columbia) 




● Analytical validity: it exists when, at a minimum, estimands can be estimated without 
bias and their confidence intervals (or the nominal level of significance for hypothesis 
tests) can be stated accurately (Rubin 1987). The estimands can be summaries of the 
univariate distributions of the variables, bivariate measures of association, or multivariate 
relationships among all variables. 
● Coarsening:  a method for protecting data that involves mapping confidential values into 
broader categories, e.g. a histogram. 
● Confidentiality: a “quality or condition accorded to information as an obligation not to 
transmit […] to unauthorized parties” (Fienberg, 2005, as quoted in Duncan et al, 2011). 
Confidentiality addresses data already collected, whereas privacy (see below) 
addresses the right of an individual to consent to the collection of data. 
● Data swapping: Sensitive data records (usually households) are identified based on a 
priori criteria, and matched to “nearby records”. The values of some or all of the other 
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variables are swapped, usually the geographic identifiers, thus effectively relocating the 
records in each other's location.  
● Differential privacy: a class of formal privacy mechanisms. For instance, ε-differential 
privacy places an upper bound, parameterized by ε, on the ability of a user to infer from 
the published output whether any specific data item, or response, was in the original, 
confidential data (Dwork & Roth 2014). 
● Dirichlet-multinomial distribution: a family of discrete multivariate probability 
distributions on a finite support of non-negative integers. The probability vector p of the 
better-known multinomial distribution is obtained by drawing from a Dirichlet distribution 
with parameter α.   
● Input noise infusion: distorting the value of some or all of the inputs before any 
publication data are built or released. 
● Posterior predictive distribution (PPD) - in Bayesian statistics, the distribution of all 
possible values conditional on the observed values.   
● Privacy: “an individual’s freedom from excessive intrusion in the quest for information 
and […] ability to choose [… what …] will be shared or withheld from others” (Duncan et 
al, 1993, quoted in Duncan et al, 2011). See also confidentiality, above. 
● Sampling: as part of SDL, works by only publishing a fractional part of the data. 
● Statistical confidentiality or SDL - Statistical disclosure limitation:  can be viewed 
as “a body of principles, concepts, and procedures that permit confidentiality to be 
afforded to data, while still permitting its use of for statistical purposes”(Duncan et al. 
2011, p.2).  
● Suppression: describes the removal of cells from a published table if its publication 
would pose a high risk of disclosure.  
